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Abstract. An attempt to define the degree of media freedom in 
contemporary Russia leads to contradiction between the declaration of the 
mass media freedom provided by the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
and the Soviet Union heritage of unequivocal control of the press by the 
government, described by Siebert et al. (1984) as the Soviet-Communist 
Press Theory. The reason for this ambiguity could be explained by the great 
deal of different factors that exert an influence on the journalism, such as 
features of mass media legislation, governmental control of the media, the 
diversity of media ownership, sources of media incomes, and traditions of 
censorship in Russia.
The current development of the media legislation in Russia shows no 
improvement regarding the freedom of speech. In the beginning of the third 
presidential term in 2012, Vladimir Putin has signed several laws that 
reduced the freedom of speech through the limitation of public assembly, 
criminalization of defamation in the mass media, and intensification of 
governmental censorship on the internet. 
On the other hand, the contemporary press freedom that appeared in 
conditions of the new market economy in the beginning of the 1990s has 
brought discredit as to the conception of an exclusively positive impact of 
unconditional freedom on the mass media since the newspapers, television 
and radio channels were controlled by several powerful oligarchs who used 
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the owned mass media to spread and support their political influence. 
However, after the authorities’ reference in the 2000s the balance was not 
regained. As a result, the majority of the media outlets in Russia became 
co-owned or fully controlled by the government.
Another crucial aspect of the mass media freedom as the cultural phe-
nomenon should be kept in mind: seven decades of severe censorship could 
not be erased from the journalism professional community’s memory in 
several years. The negative experience of predecessors transforms censorship 
into self-censorship in modern Russia.
Keywords: censorship, the mass media, neo-authoritarian system, self-
censorship, Russia.
Introduction
The attention of many Western scholars after the collapse of the So-
viet Union has been focused on the Russian media market. The main 
goal of their researches was to define the direction in which journalism 
might develop in the new state. After 70 years when the mass media 
served as a Soviet propaganda mouthpiece, it seemed quite logical to 
expect an establishment of the Western model of the mass media in 
terms of the free market. As a result, the majority of the studies of new 
journalism in Russia were based on Western normative concepts and 
frameworks. 
Meanwhile, attempts to analyze the Russian media landscape from 
the Western perspective were fairly criticized by Downing (1996) and 
Sparks and Reading (1998) who argued that the Western concepts are 
not relevant to describe the actual processes which took place in the 
field of the mass media in Russia in the last decade of the 20th century. 
They have concluded that the main specific feature of the Russian me-
dia market development is a clash of different power centers and their 
struggle for influence on society for a variety of purposes. The main 
agents of influence, defined by Sparks, were politicians, business peop-
le, media organizations’ authorities and their employees (Sparks and 
Reading, 1998: 137).
JOURNALISM RESEARCH • Science journal (Communication and information) • 2013 Nr. 6
112
This new paradigm was applied by other scientists who paid atten-
tion to the influence of state and private capital, indirect owners, 
charac teristics of the media legislation and their impact on the freedom 
of speech in the Russian media (Belin, 2002). An eloquent example of 
difference between the idealistic legislation and the harsh reality was 
reported by the Glasnost Defense Foundation. Its project Monitoring 
observed and registered the cases of conflicts between the mass media 
and the mentioned above agents of influence. In particular, the organi-
zation monitors and checks the attempts of censorship in the Russian 
media. The annual results of the Monitoring projects are presented in 
Figure 1. The data clearly demonstrate the negative trend of deteriora-
ting conditions for the freedom of speech in the Russian media.
Figure 1. Registered attempts to restrict the freedom of speech. 
Source: author (based on the annual lists of incidents of the violation of rights  
of journalists and the media in Russia by Glasnost Defense Foundation, 2012)
In the early 2000s, when Vladimir Putin became the president, it 
became apparent that relations between the media and the state could 
not be described by any normative media model. After a decade of 
illusion that the Russian media have nothing to do with authorities, 
there was no progress in the development of the freedom of speech. 
As Becker (2004: 158) concluded, the Russian press freedom in the 
1990s “was not based on institutions but on decay of the party ap-
paratus and divisions within the regime”. Nevertheless, the scholar 
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noted that there was an obvious improvement of the mass media 
conditions in comparison with the totalitarian and post-totalitarian 
periods (ibid).
Finally, the degree of press freedom in Russia is also annually evalu-
ated by independent organizations such as the Freedom House reports. 
According to these organizations, the degree of press freedom in Russia 
was very low and even worsened during the 2000s. While the Freedom 
House (2012) estimated the mass media in Russia as “partly free” in 
2002, since 2003 till the present time it is estimated as “not free”, with 
the Press Freedom Score decreasing from 60 to 81 points (where 0 is 
the best and 100 is the worst).
In this article, the current state of the Russian mass media freedom 
will be analyzed in order to find out the main factors that have given 
rise to self-censorship. We will focus on current changes in the mass 
media legislation, as on well as structural transformations in the Rus-
sian media market. For our approach, we shall examine several aspects 
of the mass media functioning which, in our opinion, have the most 
significant impact on the mass media freedom in Russia.
Government control of the media: the neo-authoritarian system
When it comes to the definition of relationship between the mass 
media and authorities, there are several categories and particular nor-
mative models suggested by different scholars. Meanwhile, in case of the 
Russian media market, it often leads to overly optimistic or pessimistic 
conclusions, as Koltsova (2001: 333) has noted. Nevertheless, in terms 
of our study, we will follow the conclusion of Becker that the Russian 
media system can be defined as a neo-authoritarian system where the 
main tool that the government uses to eliminate critics is not the pre-
publication censorship but the “economic pressure through selectively 
applied legal and quasilegal actions against owners, as well as broadly 
worded laws which prescribe criminal and civil penalties for journalists 
concerning such issues as libel, state interests, national security and the 
image of the head of state” (Becker, 2004: 149).
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Becker’s hypothesis is supported by the results of the Open Society 
Foundation project Mapping Digital Media, which noted that the usage 
of television as an organ of executive power “has persisted in the last five 
years, and the understanding of public service provision remains poor 
both among the political elite and the general public” (Open Socie ty 
Foundations, 2011: 6).
We suppose that the current situation is caused by an ultimate de-
cision of the government to use the mass media as an instrument of 
political influence, which led to structural changes in the Russian me-
dia landscape. For example, Mikhail Lesin, the former Head of Federal 
Agency on Press and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation 
and the former Kremlin advisor, was appointed as the head of the largest 
state-controlled media holding Gazprom-Media in 2013. The fact that 
a person closely connected with Kremlin runs this media giant which 
includes the biggest media assets clearly indicates that the government 
seeks absolute control over the press. When the authorities instead of 
the object of criticism become an employer, journalists are enforced to 
adopt self-censorship.
Mass media legislation:  
formal freedom with the too broad wording
Officially, the freedom of speech was guaranteed in the USSR 
Constitution (1977) which stated that “citizens of the USSR are 
guaranteed the freedom of speech (svoboda slova) and the freedom of 
press (svoboda pechati)”. 
Nethertheless, in reality it had nothing to do with the Western con-
cept of the freedom of speech, although for the Soviet mass media it 
was a relative progress, but self-censorship still remained one of the 
most important professional qualities. 
Right after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the freedom 
of speech was granted in the new Mass Media Law which was seen by 
scholars as “an awkward version of an ideal, a sometimes apolitical for-
mulation of the proper relationship between the media and the state” 
(Monroe, 1995: 795).
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The Article 29 (5) of the Constitution (1993) of the Russian Fede-
ration also granted the freedom of mass information and prohibited 
the censorship. Nevertheless, these formal guarantees lack a specific 
interpretation for the courts and cannot be considered as an effective 
source of law. The same extent of ambiguity could be found in the Law 
on Communications (2003), which eliminated any restrictions on in-
dividual privacy unless they are allowed by a court order or if other in-
structions are envisioned by a federal law. The additional federal laws, 
which reflect the tendency of strengthening the government’s pressure 
on the mass media, were presented in 2006. The Law on Information, 
Information Technologies and Protection of Information (2006) as 
well as the Law on Combating the Terrorism (2006) and the Law on 
Counteracting the Extremist Activity (2006) significantly restricted 
the freedom of journalists and allowed authorities to regulate the work 
of the media in accordance with their own needs and interests. The next 
step of the enforcement of control over the media through legislation 
was continued through adopting the so-called Internet Restriction Bill 
(Amendments to the Federal Law on Protecting Children from In-
formation Harmful to Their Health, 2012), which aims to compose a 
blacklist of websites that contain illegal content and may be blocked 
without any notification. Again, there is no clear definition concerning 
what is supposed to be illegal and harmful for the Internet users, there-
fore, this law can be used in order to shut down any web source that 
contains any alternative views. 
One of the most doubtful cases of the government’s interference in 
the media business through the legislation was an executive order “On 
the measures to make the state media more effective“ (2013) signed 
by President Putin in December. This order led to the dissolution of 
one of the most well-known Russian agency of international informa-
tion RIA Novosti and to merging it with the international radio service 
“The Voice of Russia” in order to create the federal state unitary enter-
prise International Information Agency Russia Today. The main goal of 
the newly established agency is “to provide information on the Russian 
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state policy and Russian life and society for audiences abroad”, as it is 
explained on the official website of the resident. In accordance with the 
decree, the launched Information Agency Russia Today is included in 
the list of the state’s strategic enterprises, and its CEO may be appoin-
ted only by the president. The overview of the Russian media law allows 
us to conclude that Russian authorities fully use the imprecise wording 
of the laws in their own favour, and even the relatively democratic na-
ture of the legislation does not preclude the violation of the mass media 
freedom.
Lack of diversity of the media ownership:  
the concentration of the media outlets
The lack of diversity of the media ownership was usually seen by 
Western researchers as an obvious threat to the freedom of speech 
(McChesney and Schiller, 2002: 87). We suppose that the Russian 
television has faced the most challenging changes: after the Gazprom 
takeover of the only private television channel NTV in 2000, the majo-
rity of Russian TV channels are owned or controlled by the state. And 
this was only the beginning: the trend of the concentration of television 
assets has continued in the 2010s. In November 2013, the above-men-
tioned media giant Gazprom-Media buys 100% of stakes of the media 
group ProfMedia, formerly owned by the oligarch Vladimir Potanin. 
After that merger, in addition to the already possessed assets inclu ding 
the TV networks NTV and TNT, the satellite company NTV Plus, 
the radio stations Echo of Moscow and Comedy Radio and the online 
video services Rutube and Now.ru, Gazprom-Media will also control 
the television channels TV3, 2 x 2, and Pyatnitsa, the film production 
company Central Partnership and several FM radio stations. The Rus-
sian media expert Evgeny Kuzin in the interview to the BBC Russian 
News Service (2013) has described the current situation as “some kind 
of market centralization. As a matter of fact, strengthening of Gazprom-
Media is capable of making the Gazprom-Media a single control centre 
of the Russian media industry”.
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The purchase of Prof-Media made Gazprom-Media the key player in 
the Russian advertising market, what actvally guarantees its dominance 
in getting private financing from the advertisers, another crucial factor 
that influences the media independence. According to the analytical 
magazine Profile (2013), the joint share of TV channels owned by Gaz-
prom-Media may reach 32% of the advertising market, and the antitrust 
limit which is allowed by the Federal Antimonopoly Service is 35%.
Thus, we see that the Russian mass media landscape currently expe-
riences a rapid centralization of mass media outlets, which resembles a 
return to the monopolization of the media in the Soviet era. We assume 
that this trend negatively affects the pluralism of opinions in the press 
as well as the possibility of smaller media companies to convey their 
opinions because they hardly can outvoice the merged media giants.
Conclusions
In this article, we have analyzed the most important changes in the 
Russian media market, which have an impact on the media liberty. 
Originated in the authoritarian Soviet-Communist system, the Russian 
mass media have experienced dramatic changes in the last two decades. 
Nowadays, the transition period seems to draw to a close, and we sup-
pose that the latest modifications in the media market are well-thought-
out strategies rather than random unpremeditated actions.
Our approach was to explore which of these transformations affect 
the modern Russian media landscape most. We assume that one of the 
most important factors is that the media legislation in modern Russia is 
not realistic as it lacks a specific interpretation for its using in courts. But 
even a more questionable trend is the dissolution of one of the lar gest 
news agencies in the country RIA Novosti by the president’s decree. 
Such a self-willed interpretation of legislation, in our opinion, is a 
serious barrier to the freedom of speech and the main reason for self-
censorship in the Russian media, in spite of the official prohibition of 
censorship in the Constitution. The overview of the Russian media law 
allows us to conclude that Russian authorities use the imprecise wor-
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ding of the laws in their own favour, and even the relatively liberal legis-
lation does not prevent violations of the mass media freedom. This ten-
dency matches the concept of the neo-authoritarian system suggested 
by Becker.
Another trend described in this article is that the criticism of the au-
thorities by Russian journalists is bounded as the media companies are 
controlled by the people who are loyal to the government. The example 
is the appointment of Mikhail Lesin, the former Head of the Federal 
Agency of Press and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation 
and a former Kremlin advisor, as the head of the largest state-controlled 
media holding Gazprom-Media. 
Furthermore, the latest transformations of the Russian media land-
scape, when the merger of the media group Prof-Media Gazprom-Me-
dia has established control over the advertising market, which looks 
like a return back to the monopolization of the media in the Soviet era.
The observation and analysis of the current changes in the Russian 
media landscape allow us to indicate the main obstacles to the freedom 
of speech, which were mainly established by the authorities and be-
came the basis for the neo-authoritarian system.
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